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Innovation has emerged as a central theme on the growth agenda of
Latin America. This paper examines four issues. First, how can we know
if Latin America really has an innovation problem that is behind its weak
total factor productivity performance? Second, what do we mean by
innovation and what are dimensions of it in which the region exhibits
weaknesses? Third, what does recent experience and literature suggest
for principles and broad policy measures to foment innovation? Fourth,
are there any linkages between these weaknesses and equity? Since even
in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
there is little consensus on the specific policies that governments should
implement, and even less on their suitability to developing countries, this
paper attempts to organize thinking around some basic principles and
offer suggestive experience rather than specific policy advice.
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I
Introduction
Several issues have led policy makers in Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC) to place “innovation” on the
policy agenda. First, the region’s growth performance
has been modest despite two decades of extensive
structural reforms. Since roughly half of cross-country
differences in income and growth is attributed to total
factor productivity (TFP), the poor TFP growth of Latin
America and the Caribbean in the last three decades
is a major cause for concern. While in many respects
a measure of our ignorance, TFP is often equated to
what can be loosely called “technological progress”
and, more broadly, to “innovation” (including both
technical, institutional, organizational and managerial
change and the development of new activities,
products and services, both at the firm and the
aggregate economy level). Second, much of the
discussion on competitiveness is really about
productivity, and hence has much to do with the issue
of innovation.
Finally, the region’s persistent pattern of resource-
based exports raises the questions of where other
product lines may come from –consider, for example,
forestry giant Nokia’s evolution into cell phones in the
case of Finland– and whether we can achieve better
results with what we have. On the latter point, one of
the World Bank’s flagship publications, From Natural
Resources to the Knowledge Economy,1 argued that
recent research and the experience of numerous now
developed, but resource-based economies suggest that
Prebisch was perhaps too pessimistic: resources are
neither a curse, nor a destiny that we are bound to
follow. In the document in question, our main
conclusion was that the region was not getting as much
growth out of its resources as it could, due in part to
the now familiar inefficiencies of import substitution
industrialization, which penalized those sectors, but
perhaps more fundamentally to a lack of national
learning and innovative capacity. Latin America’s
willingness to depend passively on technological
transfer from abroad, and its insufficient investments
in skills and R&D may, in the end, have been a
dimension of dependency far more damaging than
others which have received more attention in the
literature.
Hence, as in the OECD, increasingly Latin American
and Caribbean policy makers have come to identify
trade barriers and lack of incentives for innovation as
the main obstacles to further growth and development.
In pursuit of the aim of “turning the EU into the most
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world”
the March 2002 meeting of the European Council in
Barcelona announced a goal of increasing average R&D
expenditure from 1.9% of GDP to 3% by 2010 so as to
close the gap with the United States (2.7%) and Japan
(3.0%) (OECD, 2004). Latin America’s 0.4% is in a
different league altogether (De Ferranti, Perry, Guasch
and others, 2003).
This paper takes a step back to examine four
issues. First, is the region’s weak total factor
productivity performance really due to an “innovation
problem”? Second, what do we mean by innovation
and what are dimensions of it in which the region
exhibits weaknesses? Third are there any linkages
between these weaknesses and equity: an issue which
was also examined at the seminar at which a
preliminary version of the present paper was
presented? Fourth, what does recent experience and
literature suggest for principles and broad policy
measures to foment innovation? In view of the lack
of consensus on the specific policies that governments
should implement and their suitability to developing
countries, we have attempted to organize thinking
around some basic principles and to offer suggestive
experience rather than specific policy advice.
A preliminary version of this study was presented at the seminar
“Economic growth with equity: challenges for Latin America” held
at ECLAC (Santiago, Chile, 1-2 September 2005).
1 De Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney (2002).
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II
Does Latin America have an innovation problem?
The issue of innovation is especially sensitive because
the theory surrounding it is abundant in examples of
market failures which, inevitably, lead to a role that the
government must play. In a region whose history has
led it to worry so much about government failures, the
idea that the market is generating insufficient investment
in innovation may imply reversing, to some degree, the
tendency over the last 20 years towards reducing the
role of public policy in the economy. Understanding
the magnitude of the innovation problem is thus
important for judging whether the costs of existing
market failures indeed exceed the costs of potential
government failures in implementing specific
innovation policies.
The study by De Ferranti, Perry, Guasch and others
(2003), among other analyses, suggests that by common
measures of innovation effort and output, the countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean lag substantially
behind comparable countries. By OECD standards, the
region exhibits low levels of R&D expenditure and
private sector participation in R&D, low patent
production, and high relative importance of basic versus
applied research. It also performs relatively poorly
against international benchmarks of educational quality
and human resources devoted to research and
development. Such lags remain even after controlling
for per capita income.
These data, though suggestive, in themselves
cannot convincingly tell us if we have an innovation
problem or not, for several reasons. First, innovation
diagnostics often proceed as if the accumulation of
knowledge capital were a free-floating activity
independent of other factors affecting the level of a
country’s development. This is not the case, however:
globally, there is a very strong positive relationship of
TFP with the capital/labour ratio, suggesting that the
accumulation of knowledge related capital is
complementary to and is driven by many of the same
forces determining the accumulation of physical capital
(Maloney and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). In turn, this
raises the question of whether a country’s perceived
innovation shortfall results from problems common to
accumulation overall, or whether the activity of
innovation itself is somehow especially impeded by
specific market, institutional or policy failures.
These likely complementarities also suggest that
any discussion on promoting innovation should occur
within the context of the climate for promoting
accumulation overall. There is a precedent for this broad
view in the dual approach the New Zealanders are taking
–upgrading their education and science and technology
infrastructure, but also focusing heavily on business
mentorship, competition policy, and incentives to “get
off the island” and export– generally creating a demand
for innovation. Many Latin American countries face a
similar challenge, and because of their small domestic
markets and distance from larger ones they are more
like New Zealand than Spain or Italy, which, with their
integration into the European Community, gained
exposure to energetic forces of competition, other ways
of doing business, and broader markets. The danger of
not taking this view is that innovation policy may occur
as a kind of sexy but isolated activity de-linked from
the less glamorous work of finding out why firms may
lack dynamism overall.
However, even after accounting for accumulation
of human and physical capital, the Latin American
countries still appear to have an innovation problem.
Maloney and Rodriguez Clare (2005) calibrate a model
that allows us to conclude that, given the measured level
of accumulation of human and physical capital, many
countries in the region show relatively low levels of TFP
and implicitly high barriers to innovative activity. The
country that they analysed most carefully in terms of
data, Chile, appears to have an innovation problem apart
from a general accumulation problem.
It is important to note that the calibrated model
cannot distinguish between innovation problems and
other inefficiencies that drag down TFP. An emerging
literature in Chile and elsewhere has stressed the
importance of microeconomic adjustment costs as an
explanation for poor TFP performance. Caballero,
Cowan and others (2004) argue that microeconomic
flexibility is the core of creative destruction,
productivity increases and economic growth, and that
rigidities can be very costly. Focusing on labour
legislation, they estimate the effects of job security
using a sample of 60 countries for 1980-1998 and find
that increasing job security significantly lowers the
speed of adjustment to shocks in a third and reduces
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productivity growth by almost 1% (for countries with
strong rule of law, Chile among them). Caballero,
Cowan and others (2004) go even further, suggesting
that the reduction in productivity growth after 1997 in
Chile was due largely to an increase in microeconomic
inflexibility, and potentially can reduce structural long
run growth by 0.5% yearly.
While this line of argument is compelling, several
pieces of evidence suggest that innovation still remains
a strong candidate for explaining deficient TFP and
sluggish growth.
First, if we were to explain the TFP gap solely by
adjustment costs, Maloney and Rodriguez Clare’s
calibration suggests that the inefficiencies compared
with the United States would appear to be surprisingly
large given the extensive micro reforms to date in Chile.
Second, history suggests that deficient national
innovative capacity has been a major barrier to post-
war Latin American growth.2 De Ferranti, Perry,
Lederman and Maloney (2002) offer several examples
in this respect, perhaps the most illustrative being that
of Chile. In the case of the Chilean mining sector, Pinto
(1959) argued that local mining companies did not
engage in learning by doing in the lower-tech phases
of mining and hence “faced with the technological
revolution, the local mining companies had behind them
neither sufficient accumulated resources, nor the
organizational or administrative capacity that were
indispensable. In these circumstances, there was no
other option but the introduction of foreign capital and
expertise.” Meller (2001) describes how Chile’s
technological position continued to deteriorate: “in the
1950s one could have learned more about Chilean
copper in foreign libraries than in Chilean ones. Neither
was there training of Chilean engineers and technicians
specializing in copper.” Only in 1965 would Chile
develop domestic capacity to analyse the role of the
copper industry and educate Chilean professionals and
technicians in the management of the large copper
firms. Meanwhile, Australia’s development of an
extensive mining cluster and the University of New
South Wales’ position as the largest generator of mining
engineers in the world perhaps explains why they, and
not Chileans, discovered the La Escondida mine, despite
the fact that Chile was an exporter of copper well before
Australia. Wright (2001) sees innovation issues behind
the resource underperformance of Peru and other
mining countries as well. Other examples from Mexico
and Brazil discussed in De Ferranti, Perry, Lederman
and Maloney (2002) show the importance of innovative
capacity both for taking advantage of existing areas of
comparative advantage and also, presumably,
discovering new ones.
Finally, although the argument that “everybody else
is doing it” is seldom compelling in itself, it is
interesting to note that comparable countries such as
Spain and New Zealand –the latter a country whose
reform trajectory closely parallels that of the Latin
American countries– are focusing heavily on innovation
as critical to their future growth.
To be sure, these perspectives on the reasons for
deficient TFP are completely compatible. Resolving
problems of microeconomic adjustment must be a
central part of the innovation agenda, broadly construed
as raising the capacity of firms to introduce
productivity-improving measures at the firm level.
2 See Maloney (2002) for a further elaboration of these arguments.
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III
What type of innovation do the
Latin American countries lack?
Although the literature often uses R&D as a conveniently
available proxy for innovation effort, both at the
aggregate and at the firm level, it is not clear what
measures of innovation we should be looking at. Despite
the amount that has been written on the importance of
R&D to the learning process and technological transfer,
the distinction between adoption and invention gives
grounds for suspecting that R&D may be less important
for less developed countries than for more advanced
countries. Even within the OECD, some observers argue
that the role of R&D is small compared with the
introduction of new organizational and managerial
practices.3 The question arises, then: what are the
ingredients of a good innovation-related strategy for
TFP growth? Further, do the differing recipes for
achieving growth of the present levels of income all
offer equally sound foundations for future income
growth? The answers to these questions clearly affect
how we measure innovation deficiencies and how we
focus policy in this respect.
A first glance at the use of four commonly cited
ingredients involved in technological transfer, adjusted
for level of development, suggests some provocative
conclusions (Maloney, 2005b). Figure 1 shows that the
R&D trend rises sharply with the development process,
but there is substantial variance around this trend, with
the Latin American countries generally falling below
it. Licensing and tertiary education follow similar
trends, although less dramatically, and in these
dimensions the region’s performance is more mixed.
However, just as in the case of the unconditional
indicators generally used, we must be cautious using
these measures as innovation diagnostics as well.
Standard growth theory suggests that investments in
innovation, as in the case of physical investments, drive
the steady state level of output. Hence, these investment
FIGURE 1
Selected countries: R&D across the development process
(Percentages)
Source: Lederman and Maloney (2003).
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3 Comin (2004) argues that in the United States, for example, less
that 3 to 5 tenths of a percentage point of the 2.2% annual growth
rate in productivity is attributable to R&D.
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levels cannot be seen as measures of performance, but
rather as recipes for attaining the observed level of
income. From a pure efficiency perspective, China’s
high level of R&D spending shown in figure 1 may reflect
a penchant for technological white elephants, while,
less plausibly, Latin America’s low levels of tertiary
education might reflect hyper-efficient use of those
scarce resources. Clearly, economic structure –the fact
that Latin America and the Caribbean specialize in
goods that, on average, have low “innovation
intensities”, measured for example as R&D/value added–
also influences the patterns we see.4 Still, two
observations are worth making in this respect.
First, the Latin American countries and the high-
tech miracles have followed very different recipes with
regard to R&D, foreign direct investment (FDI),
licensing, and education. Finland and South Korea
relied very little on FDI and very heavily on R&D and
licensing of foreign technologies: a pattern that China
is also following. This partly reflects their
specialization in electronic products, which are
especially R&D intensive. In contrast, Latin America
has followed a recipe that has relied little on R&D or
licensing and heavily on FDI. This is a perhaps a
worrisome finding, in view of the low rates of
technological transfer with FDI documented by
numerous authors and even more so in the light of the
generally passive approach to the idea of taking
advantage of the technological benefits of FDI. In
Mexico, for example, although IBM and Hewlett
Packard have been present for 30 years in Guadalajara,
there is little evidence of a knowledge cluster in
computer technologies, at least according to the data
available on patent applications (figure 2).
Though often cited as a possible model for the
region, Ireland’s recipe of relying on extremely high
levels of licensing is sui generis and derives from its
unique position as an English-speaking bridge from the
United States to the European Union: conditions which
are not likely to be replicated in our region. The most
striking finding is that Spain (and also Italy, though
not shown in the figure) appears to follow the Latin
American recipe, having made little effort in either R&D
or licensing in order to attain their relatively high levels
of income. Spain has converged rapidly to frontier
income levels over the last 30 years, and provides an
important alternative to the Asian newly industrialized
countries as a benchmark for Latin America. This
suggests that there is considerable potential in non-R&D
sources of TFP growth, such as the adoption of
organizational and management innovation (Caselli and
Tenreyro, 2004).
4 Since the analysis was conducted in the light of income and not
TFP, this may suggest that high non-innovation accumulation drove
income growth, as suggested above.
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FIGURE 2
Selected countries: Deviation from trend for four indicators
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IV
Medium- and long- term
innovation policy
design tradition, investments in these areas may make
as much sense as those in science and technology. In
more general terms, it is unclear what kind of
ingredients are required for the discovery of new areas
of comparative advantage of whatever kind, as stressed
by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
What cannot be overstressed is that, given the
relatively little insight we have into the dynamics and
choices of firms, we must be very careful that the
demand by enterprises for innovation of whatever kind
is kept at centre stage in the policy dialogue, lest
investments in supply-side measures be rendered
useless from the productivity point of view or, still
worse, be turned into a sideshow distracting attention
from the truly critical issues.
Having said this, investment in science and
technology and R&D is important now and appears even
more essential over the longer term for generating
sustained growth. First, as initially argued by Cohen
and Levinthal (1989), R&D is essential not only for
generating new knowledge, but also for enhancing
firms’ absorptive capacity. This means that policies to
Thus, more attention needs to be paid to fomenting these
perhaps less celebrated aspects of innovation over the
medium term. Benavente (2004) shows that in, fact,
innovations in processes, design, organization etc. are
as common in Chile as those in products, which are
often associated with R&D expenditure (figure 3), and
this pattern is relatively similar to those we find in the
OECD. Figure 4, however, suggests that the actual
amounts firms in Argentina and Chile are spending on
innovation-related activities as a share of turnover is
very low. In the case of Chile, the high heterogeneity
among firms within the same sector suggests that
increasing the productivity of firms that are well behind
the frontier could have substantial effects on TFP
growth.5
Unfortunately, we do not know much about what
makes some firms pursue such innovations and others
not, or what policies would encourage them to do so.
The system of Technological Centres in Spain has been
central to enhancing the capacity of small and medium-
sized enterprises, clustering, networking and
cooperative activities. The fact that both Spain and Italy
have seen large productivity gains by relatively small
firms suggests that more research is needed to gain a
better understanding of the constraints these firms face
and what policies are effective in raising their
technological “absorptive capacity”- the ability to use
and benefit from existing information. Further, given
the complementarities with capital accumulation, the
standard litany of needed reform measures in credit,
infrastructure, labour markets, etc. also needs to be
reviewed with an eye towards their particular
implications for innovation.
In addition, a more creative approach to innovation
may turn up new areas of comparative advantage for
the region. In Italy, for example, sales of the fashion
industry now exceed those of the automobile industry.
For countries such as Mexico or Colombia with a strong
5 See Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2002) for evidence on
Chile. This argument has been stressed by Chen and Dahlman
(2004).
FIGURE 3
Chile: Percentage of manufacturing
establishments declaring that they have
made innovations in various aspects
of the production process, 1998 and 2001
Source: Benavente (2004).
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strengthen technology transfer have little value if
industry does not have a critical mass of human capital
with a highly technical bent able to turn new knowledge
into business opportunities. In addition, most
technological transfers need significant adaptation to
local resources, market conditions, etc, and substantial
R&D is required for this. Much of the R&D in advanced
countries like France is not oriented towards “new”
products or techniques, but towards efficient transfer
and adaptation of new technologies developed
elsewhere.
Second, the slackening recent performance of Italy
and Spain suggests that even though Latin America
should focus on these broader types of innovations in
the medium term, there is no substitute for investments
in science and technology, more appropriately captured
by R&D, over the longer term. Italy, with negative TFP
growth rates over the last decade, has recently been
awarded the honorary “Sick Man of Europe” award by
The Economist, partly because of its weak science and
technology capacity. Spain has been worried about this
and has been aggressively upgrading both its own R&D
efforts and its collaboration with research centers in
the rest of Europe. In the context of the convergence
club model developed by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005), limiting itself to the adoption of technologies
would doom Spain forever to a lower level of income
than those who really invent.6 This scenario also appears
to haunt other countries with conditionally average
levels of R&D. Denmark, New Zealand, Australia and
Canada are increasingly concerned that this has left
them as good adopters rather than as countries capable
of staying in front in the innovation game, where the
big gains appear to lie. Blomström, Kokko and Sjoholm
(2002) argue that the application of a similar logic
pushed Singapore into a position of being more of a
knowledge generator than a mere adopter, in contrast
with its previous more typically Latin American stance
of relying on FDI and licensing.
Such an effort requires not only increased
resources, but also increased efficiency in how those
resources are used. De Ferranti, Perry, Guasch and
others (2003) suggest that Latin America lags behind
in this respect as well. Figure 5 looks at the efficiency
in the creation of knowledge, using patents as a proxy,
and finds that Latin America has substantially lower
elasticities of patents with respect to R&D than
comparator countries. Since the microeconomic studies
generally find elasticities around 0.5 in the region,
6 See Maloney (2002) for an application of this view to the
underperformance in terms of natural resources displayed by Latin
America.
FIGURE 4
Europe (average) and selected European and Latin American countries:
Innovation-related activities, various years
(Percentage of turnover)
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FIGURE 5























































































Source: Bosch, Lederman and Maloney (2004).
FIGURE 6
Selected countries: Subjective evaluation of research
quality and degree of collaboration, 2002



































































































Source: World Economic Forum (2002).
Quality of scientific institutions Cooperation between universities and private sector
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whereas the OECD is closer to 1, the lower performance
of the Latin American countries suggests that they are
less able to exploit knowledge spillovers than they ought
to be. Figure 6, which reports the subjective responses
of entrepreneurs to a World Economic Forum
questionnaire, suggests that Latin America does quite
poorly on a 7 point scale as regards the degree of
interaction between the private sector and research
centers. In turn, this may reflect the generally low opinion
that the private sector has of the local research centres.7
It also appears that in the region overall, roughly 60% of
R&D resources are devoted to basic research, whereas the
comparable figure for the United States is 15%, and a
very low percentage is carried on or financed by the
private sector, contrary to what happens in countries that
are more effective in this respect. This suggests some
misalignment between the incentives given to the
institutions doing research and the actual needs of the
local economies, as well as a lack of incentives for private
firms to engage in R&D activities themselves.
V
Specific policies and institutions
for fostering innovation
Since, there is as yet no set of best practices in the OECD
that can be easily extrapolated to the Latin American
context, in this section we seek only to set forth some
considerations emerging from the literature that could
be useful for policy making.8
1. Dealing with appropriability and spillovers of
innovation: intellectual property rights versus
subsidies and tax credits
The potential high spillovers of innovation imply that
social returns are much higher than private returns and
thus the innovative effort of individual firms, left to
themselves, would be suboptimal from a social point
of view, even if barriers and artificial disincentives were
removed. Two types of instruments have been used to
deal with this problem: intellectual property rights, and
public subsidies (through different means such as public
supply, matching grants, or tax credits).
Traditionally, the transition process from scientific
activity to technological breakthroughs and their
development, application and diffusion has been seen
as a linear process in which spillovers are higher at the
scientific end and lower at the applied end. This view
leads to the concentration of public subsidies at the
scientific and basic technological research level (which
in many countries is fully financed by public resources
assigned to universities and public research institutes)
and the use of “strong” intellectual property rights at
the more applied side of the process, since such rights
help to solve the appropriability problem at the expense
of actually reducing spillovers and diffusion (since
imitators or users must now pay a royalty cost).
Romer (2005) and Rosenberg (2005)9 have argued
that this view is incorrect, as in practice there is a strong
backwards feedback loop from application to
technological and scientific discovery: many, if not most
scientific breakthroughs have emerged from attempts
to solve concrete problems at the production end and
the basic questions and problems that such attempts
have posed to more basic technological and scientific
research. Hence, it makes sense to distribute public
subsidies more evenly across the process, using
matching grants or tax credits at the applied side, and
relying less on “strong” intellectual property rights for
stimulating applied technological R&D. This parallels
the discussion about the relative efficiency of supply
and demand side subsidies in other areas: subsidies
should be oriented not only to the supply side (basic
scientific and technological capacity and activities), but
7 Both the variables considered in figure 6 appear to be correlated
with the elasticity of knowledge creation, as also are education
levels and intellectual property rights (Bosch, Lederman and
Maloney, 2005).
8 This section draws heavily on Maloney (2005a).
9 Both these papers were presented at the Conference on “R&D and
Innovation in the Development Process: A New Look at Theory,
Evidence and Policies”, (World Bank/Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Barcelona, 9-11 June 2005).
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should also aim to stimulate demand for innovation
from firms.10
Authors like these thus question whether the
orientation given to trade-related intellectual property
rights in the World Trade Organization (WTO) may not
be inefficient from a systemic point of view. Deciding
the precise kind of intellectual property rights which
are most appropriate for countries at a level of
development similar to that of Latin America is beyond
the scope of this paper, and the reader is referred to the
broad literature on this subject.11
What we should consider here is the relative
efficiency of tax credits versus direct subsidies (e.g.,
under matching fund schemes) to stimulate firms’
demand for innovation. Arguments in favour of tax
credits for R&D expenditure rather than direct subsidies
point to potential rent seeking and other government
failures in “selecting winners” through subsidy
schemes. However, the inefficiencies of tax credits are
also well known: i) they are not proportional to the
difference between social and private rates of return,
as they should be, but instead to R&D costs; ii) in most
cases, they are proportional to total annual R&D costs,
and although this may lead to some marginal R&D
projects being executed, most of the resources will
benefit intra-marginal R&D that would be carried out
anyway. In such cases, benefits will be low compared
to the high fiscal costs. Some countries, like the United
States, have attempted to design an incremental “R&D”
tax credit, but problems related to the definition and
measurement of the corresponding “base” are huge;
iii) they create an incentive to artificially classify non-
R&D expenses as R&D, which may not be easy for tax
authorities to detect, especially in developing countries
where technical and administrative capacities are low.
Some studies –although they do not include a cost/
benefit analysis– have found that tax credits do indeed
increase private R&D in OECD countries. In most of the
Latin American countries, however, where tax regimes
are already full of exemptions, tax credits and loopholes,
and where administrative capacity is weak, it is highly
doubtful that the fiscal costs would not be large in
comparison to the potential benefits. Probably only
countries like Chile and Brazil, which have shown that
they can enforce tax laws with some effectiveness,
should think of trying out this instrument. We would
not recommend it for most of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries at this stage, however.
Instead, efforts might initially be devoted to
improving the design of the subsidy schemes that
already exist in many countries in the region, thereby
possibly overcoming these problems (as well as serving
as a good instrument to promote cooperation between
firms and universities/research Institutes and to foment
R&D by the latter on public goods – health, the
environment, etc.). Some of these schemes have proven
quite effective, but in other cases there seems to be too
much duplication and lack of efficiency criteria.12
Examining successful experiences around the world,
some general guidelines can be extracted on how to
maximize their potential benefits, while mitigating the
risks of rent seeking and government failure:
i) First, there is the issue of governance: who
regulates and administers the system? To reduce the
probability of government failures and rent seeking and
ensure commercial relevance, it is advisable to ensure
participation by the private sector –through broad
business associations– and the academic world. In view
of the limited size of the science and technology
community in most Latin American and Caribbean
countries and the fact that local knowledge will not be
at the frontier in many areas, approval of schemes in
specific areas should be given by expert committees
which should include foreign experts. Although Finland
is now at the frontier of technological creation in many
areas, its highly successful national technology agency
(TEKES) nevertheless makes routine pilgrimages to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the
National Science Foundation (NSF) and other global
centers of advanced knowledge in order to identify
emerging new directions of technological research.
ii) Second, there is the issue of the size of the
subsidy. Theoretically, it would be desirable to make it
proportional to the difference between social and private
rates of return, but this is quite difficult in practice.
Perhaps it would be useful to specify ex ante a range
for the matching contribution to costs (estimates suggest
that this should be around the level of 50% or more to
be effective, in line with the OECD’s usual benchmark),
while leaving some discretion to the experts and the
competent authorities for classifying proposals in a few
categories (with different rates of subsidy), depending
10 In order to satisfy their demand for technology transfer, creation
or adaptation, firms may build their own R&D supply capacity at
home, contract the work out to universities, research centres, etc.,
or, more usually, use a combination of both methods.
11 See, for instance, Maskus (2000) and Fink and Maskus (2005).
12 See Sanguinetti (2004) for Argentina, and Benavente (2004) for
Chile.
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on their assessment of how large the spillovers may be
with respect to costs. Some categories of research (on
public goods, or basic technological research with a
wide array of potential applications) could
systematically receive higher proportions of subsidy
than others. Alternatively, it has been suggested that
the ratio of subsidy should not be fixed administratively
(Link and Scott, 2004), but should be subject to
competitive bidding so as to guarantee that hurdle rates
are met, but not widely exceeded. However, this can at
best be only one of several selection criteria, as
otherwise there would be a bias towards selection of
projects with low differences between the social and
private rates of return.
iii) Third, there is the issue of the allocation of
funds among various areas or the promotion of
“strategic” areas. Some highly successful countries like
Finland have found it appropriate to concentrate support
in a few broad areas in which there is already some
capacity and activity and in which the country is deemed
to be competitive (so as to avoid a narrow approach
involving “picking winners”, but at the same time
seeking to avoid spreading scarce resources and
evaluation capacities too thinly). Thus, it might make
sense to either give priority (other things being equal)
or to pre-allocate part of the funds to a few well-selected
broad areas in which there is already revealed
comparative advantage (as measured, for example, by
export ratios and export dynamism) or strong reasons
to believe that comparative advantage can be easily
developed. Even so, some funds should be reserved for
“open” competition, as development of new,
unexpected activities or exports might be quite critical
for growth (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). Furthermore,
some critical areas of non-tradables which have
important public good characteristics, such as tropical
health, or which involve environmental and
infrastructural issues, might also be pre-specified as
priority “strategic” areas. In any case, care must be taken
to prevent such “sectoral” allocations from becoming
areas of rent-seeking by business or academic groups.
iv) Fourth, given the importance of developing
stronger ties between universities and research centres
or institutes and firms in Latin America, priority could
be given to proposals that involve cooperation. Also,
given the low contribution currently made by firms in
much of the region, some priority could be given to
proposals presented and partially financed by
productive firms. Participation by small and medium-
sized enterprises could also receive some priority. Such
characteristics might “add” points for the final selection,
but the overriding criteria should be “technical
soundness and capacity” and “relevance and potential
spillovers.” In Chile, the Production Development
Corporation (CORFO), the National Commission for
Scientific and Technological Research (CONYCIT) and
the National Foundation for Agricultural Innovation
(FIA) recently launched a special programme to
stimulate such forms of cooperation.
v) Finally, in view of the importance of
experimentation and learning in this area, careful
monitoring and evaluation systems should be
established from the start.
2. The role of universities
and public research institutes
Given that the capacity to undertake major R&D activities
requires a critical mass and that spillovers might be
higher at the scientific and basic technological research
level (as well as in the area of public goods), there is
clearly a role for specialized science and technology
institutions. It is no surprise, then, that such non-market
R&D institutions have developed everywhere. Research
centres are often part of or related to universities, given
the big synergies and interrelations between innovation
and specialized skills in the modern world. Indeed, most
R&D in Latin America (perhaps too much, as discussed
above) has so far been carried out by such entities,
especially universities, but unfortunately often in
splendid isolation from the productive sector and with
too much concentration on the “basic” research side.
Most agricultural and natural resource-related research,
in particular, has been carried out by public research
institutes, with mixed results (De Ferranti, Perry,
Lederman and Valdés, 2004). The key issue to be
tackled is thus how to enhance cooperation between
such institutions and the productive sector and how to
stimulate more relevant and applied technological
research. Some guidelines derived from successful
experiences are the following:
i) Funding for research in such agencies should
increasingly be obtained through competition rather
than entitlement. This has already begun to happen in
some countries in the region.
ii) However, given the need to maintain critical
mass and some degree of continuity in the science and
technology field, there is a need to balance “basic
financing” (whose amount should be reviewed every
few years against performance) and competitive finance
for programmes and projects through the matching
grant funds discussed above. It is possible to go too far
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in the direction of competitive programme/project
financing, as the New Zealand experience shows and
as seems to have happened with agricultural research
reform in some Latin American countries in recent
years. Finland’s VTT technological research centre
combines about 25% base financing for research
institutes, with nearly 25% private finance and around
50% matching grants from the TEKES national
technological agency.
iii) The structure of incentives to researchers is
critical: both promotion and rewards should depend on
performance. The way intellectual property rights are
allocated is also critical: though universities or institutes
might keep a part of the royalties from possible patents
(as a reward for the risks they run in supporting and
partially funding research), most of them should go the
researchers themselves. The allocation of intellectual
property rights among firms, universities and
researchers in the case of R&D contracted by firms or
carried out under cooperative arrangements is also
crucial. Little progress has been made so far in Latin
America in these areas, in contrast to what happened
long ago in the United States with the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980,13 whose evaluations are generally positive
(though not fully conclusive).
iv) Infrastructure is also important: laboratories,
technology transfer offices, etc. The purpose of the latter
offices is to develop networks of industrial partners,
set up guidelines for the commercialization of research
results and manage the intellectual property rights of
universities, science parks and incubators. Many Latin
American universities have began to create such offices
to carry out some of these functions, though few of
them are really effective yet.
v) All kinds of links between firms and universities
and research institutes should be encouraged (not just
links in respect of R&D): student practices, specialized
training, and advisory and consultancy services. Some
Latin American universities have also begun to move
strongly in such directions, especially in countries
where there is more competition among public and
private universities.
vi) Finally, governance and culture are key
elements. The presence of private sector representatives
on university and research institutes boards and
committees could be quite useful in this regard.
However, there might be a more basic cultural problem
in many Latin American universities which evolved
from the more monastic humanistic conception
prevalent in Continental Europe and which show some
reluctance to mix in “worldly affairs” and to play a
more practical role, especially as the handmaidens of
industry. Overcoming this requires a profound national
debate on the role and purpose of universities.
3. Other specialized institutions
There are other important functions within the national
innovation system that demand the existence of
specialized public, private or hybrid institutions that
will act as “honest brokers” with no direct market
interest in the outcomes (Link and Scott, 2004). The
most important are:
i) Promulgation and adoption of standards and
certification.
ii) Extension services to transfer technologies and
management techniques, especially in sectors such as
light industry and agriculture, where the predominantly
small size of the enterprises implies lower
appropriability of the benefits of the adoption of
technologies and credit and information constraints are
larger.
iii) Coordination and facilitation of cooperative R&D
efforts joining industry, government and universities
in research projects subsidized by the government, as
well as oversight functions in respect of publicly funded
or subsidized private research.
iv) Serving as international “antennae”, to identify
new directions in technology and R&D and foster
cooperation with international institutions in specific
areas.
Institutions that carry on functions i) and ii) above
are common (though not always effective) in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Fundación Chile is a very
successful example of an institution that carries on
activities in areas ii), iii) and iv) above, but it has proved
difficult to replicate it successfully in other countries
of the region.
4. Innovation clusters
Since innovation (and skill enhancing) spillovers are
often mainly limited to a particular sector or to a group
of inter-related firms (including suppliers, distributors
and users), it makes sense to tailor and concentrate part
of the innovation policy support on “innovation
clusters” that may internalize many of the externalities
of the innovation process. The key here seems to be to
support emerging clusters (where the private sector13 Patent and Trademark Law Amendment Act (1980).
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itself has taken the initiative) and not to attempt to
promote them from scratch.
The national innovation system may efficiently
contain some sectoral innovation systems. However,
cluster-type policies can be a complement to but not a
substitute for a properly functioning overall national
innovation system, as the latter must facilitate the
emergence of industries that are not on the government’s
radar screen. Israel and Finland seem to have been able
to reach a good balance between a strong and efficient
overall national innovation system, complemented with
a few sectoral clusters.
Clusters should essentially be vehicles for efficient
public/private cooperation to solve market and
coordination failures, not just to promote innovation
and skill enhancement. They can be extremely useful
for identifying constraints and coordination failures in
supplies, infrastructure (particularly in transport),
marketing, attraction of foreign direct investment, etc.
However, they can also lead either to rent-seeking
behaviour (through unwarranted protection and
inefficient or inequitable subsidies) or to artificial and
costly development of local suppliers. In particular, the
encouragement of “vertical” clusters –which were
historically considered to be of key importance in many
countries– may lead to very inefficient outcomes in
today’s world of much lower communications and
transport times and costs and higher international
production integration within production chains (De
Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney, 2002).
5. International connections
Given that most of the development of new technologies
(and other innovations) will continue to take place
internationally (and, in fact, in only a few countries,
multinational firms and centres of excellence), it is
highly important that the national innovation system
should be highly international in character. International
links among firms,14 among universities and among
local firms and foreign universities are essential and
should be stimulated by innovation policies.
International circulation of the best brains, in
particular, is central to the operation of an efficient
national innovation system, as a considerable proportion
of knowledge transfers and cooperation in innovation
still depends on individuals and the contacts between
them. Individuals learning in centres of excellence or
working in firms and institutions that are leaders in
innovation (or even simply more advanced than
domestic agents) can become catalytic agents for
innovation and change upon their return to their own
countries. Likewise, hiring foreign researchers,
technicians, managers and business advisors or
temporarily bringing them in through institutional
exchanges or other means may help enormously to spur
innovation and change. Governments, universities,
research institutes and firms should therefore stimulate
such interchanges. International temporary immigration
agreements (such as that currently being discussed
between the United States and Mexico) and advances
in the World Trade Organization on the movement of
persons could be an important part of the international
dimension of innovation policies.
Even the feared (and initially costly) “brain drain”
can eventually be turned into an advantage. The
Russian-Jewish, Chinese, Irish and Indian diasporas
have come to play a crucial role in this regard (as well
as in opening trade and FDI opportunities) for Israel,
China, Ireland and India, respectively, often triggered
when sensible policies in these countries created a
strong investment, innovation and growth environment.
Some Latin American countries (governments, private
sector and research community working jointly or
sometimes independently) are beginning to organize
effective networks of their skilled nationals who have
emigrated to the United States, Europe and other regions
and to stimulate their involvement with different public
and private initiatives at home. Such policies may give
significant pay-offs in the future.
14 A significant number of technology transfers and innovations
happen through interaction with and support from foreign suppliers
and buyers.
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VI
A link back to equity?
Moving away from science and technology to a more
general innovation agenda allows us to establish a link
back to the second focus of this conference, equity, and
more generally to the important complementarities of
human and other innovation-related capital stressed in
De Ferranti, Perry, Guasch and others (2003).
Recent thinking suggests that Latin America’s
persistent wealth inequality may have played a role in
slowing the region’s ability to adopt foreign
technologies.15 Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff (2000)
argue that the period of sustained economic growth
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that
distinguished the United States and Canada from the
other New World economies was fundamentally due to
the patterns of settlement and crops, which led to a
relatively unequal distribution of income in the slower-
growing areas. This concentration preserved the
political influence of the advantaged elites and led to
the marginalization of much of the population, as
measured by lower access to enfranchisement, natural
resources, financial institutions and property rights, as
well as primary schooling.
The lower access to education may have been
particularly important. The concerns with social control,
extreme inequality of income, weak public finance, and
perhaps an intellectual commitment to a small State
sector, all led to dramatically smaller efforts in Latin
America, as compared with the successful natural
resource exporters, towards the achievement of
universal education. By 1870, more than 70% of the
population aged 10 or above in Australia, the United
States, Canada, and Sweden was literate: three times
the percentage in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and
Cuba, and four times the percentage in Brazil and
Mexico. Latin America progressed unevenly towards
higher levels over the next half century. By 1925,
Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica had attained
literacy rates of over 66%, while Mexico, Brazil,
Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala and
Honduras continued to hover around 30% until much
later (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000).
As Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, p. 287) note,
this is particularly important because early
industrialization reflected the cumulative impact of
incremental advances made by individuals throughout
the economy, rather than being driven by progress in a
single industry or the actions of a narrow elite. They
note –as one manifestation critical to the development
of innovation– that the greater equality in human capital
accounted partially for the high rates of invention in
the United States overall. They also argue that “the more
general concern with the opportunities for extracting
returns from inventions contributed to a patent system
which was probably, at the time, the most favorable in
the world to common people. This stands in stark
contrast to Mexico and Brazil, where patents were
restricted by costs and procedures to the wealthy or
influential, and where the rights to organize
corporations and financial institutions were granted
sparingly, largely to protect the value of rights already
held by powerful interests.”
Blomström and Kokko (2001) argue that in
Sweden, the introduction of a mandatory school system
in 1842 and emphasis on literacy and numeracy was a
key factor in the ability of individuals and firms to learn
and adopt new technologies: much elementary learning
and technology transfer was based on written
instructions such as blueprints and handbooks. This also
suggests that the extensive literature comparing
Argentina and Australia may be missing a critical point.
Despite a strong feeling of “there but for the grace of
God go we” on the part of Australian authors, it is very
clear that, in the mid-nineteenth century, Australia was
far closer to the industrialized countries in levels of
literacy; and this, in a country that until the 1840s was
a penal colony of the United Kingdom! The story of
the global conglomerate Broken Hill Proprietary
Company, Ltd. (BHP), started by a boundary rider on a
sheep station, shows the importance of a broad base of
literate citizens who can grasp new ideas and have the
benefit of institutions that provide support in this field.
A recent study by Klinger and Lederman (2005)
suggests that such impacts are still relevant and seeks
to explain two dimensions of innovation. The first is
discovery, measured as new export industries
introduced (as argued by Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003),
and the second is patenting activity. The first understates
innovative activity for advanced countries, since their15 See Maloney (2002) for more discussion.
41C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 5
TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT INNOVATION POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA  •  WILLIAM F. MALONEY AND GUILLERMO PERRY
industrial structures are already quite complete and new
exports will need to be “invented”, while patenting
activity understates overall innovative activity in poor
countries, where diffusion of existing technologies may
be more the order of the day. Using both measures,
Klinger and Lederman find that population is, as might
be expected, a significant determinant. In addition,
however, poverty, the Gini coefficient for income
distribution and the proportion of the labour force with
secondary education also enter significantly. This can
be interpreted as meaning that the “effective innovative
population” is important for the generation of new ideas
and growth. In so far as Latin America has reduced its
effective innovative population by keeping education,
wealth and access to institutions restricted to a relatively
narrow elite, growth in total factor productivity is likely
to have been hampered.
Furthermore, in societies where the elites heavily
emphasized theology and philosophy (economics may
be considered as the 20th century equivalent in this
respect) and showed a disdain for applied fields such
as engineering, the very skewed access to education
and low social mobility is likely to have restricted the
supply of aspiring middle-class workers who formed
the backbone of the inventive and/or engineering classes
in the advanced countries. Once again, as table 1 shows,
the difference of Colombia and Chile, on the one hand,
and Australia on the other at the turn of the 20th century
in terms of the density of engineers in the population is
dramatic. The lost opportunities in terms of cumulative
learning by doing locked the region into a dependent
relationship with the advanced countries not only in
the invention of new technological know-how, but also
its diffusion.
TABLE 1
Selected countries: Density of engineers
at the turn of the twentieth century






United States 1920 128
Source: Maloney (2002).
VII
Conclusions: the need for
a comprehensive view
Latin America and the Caribbean have an innovation
problem in addition to the gap in accumulation, and
this problem manifests itself both in the level of
innovative effort in many areas and also in the way this
effort spills over to other actors in the economy. Thus,
innovation appears to merit an important place on the
policy agenda.
Innovation policy goes beyond science and
technology policy. Even if we accept deficient total
factor productivity as being entirely due to low levels
of technological progress and not inefficiencies, this
still leaves numerous areas that need to be addressed,
such as barriers to the creation of more innovative firms,
deficient absorptive capacity of firms, internal obstacles
(labour legislation, for instance) or credit market
barriers to the adoption of extant technologies, and
weak science and technology infrastructure and lack
of incentives to innovate. Hence promoting innovation
requires a broader vision of the factors that could
impede it and therefore a broader set of diagnostics
than those related to science and technology per se.
Stimulating innovation in these broader areas requires
that attention be focused on the capabilities of firms
and incentives for enhancing them: developing
entrepreneurial skill and a taste for innovation, and
dealing with both innovation- and non-innovation
related barriers and market failures that hamper broad-
based productivity growth.
The capabilities of firms in terms of technological
upgrading are of fundamental importance. Although the
discussion often takes place at the aggregate level,
productivity growth is primarily a firm-level
phenomenon. If there is no demand for innovation on
the part of the private sector, efforts to improve science
and technology capacity on the supply side will be
ineffectual. Fundamentally, spending public money to
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provide a public good in this field will be “pushing on
a string” and will not lead to productivity growth unless
the private sector takes up the challenge.
The private sector of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries must prepare itself for this
transition. Although the composition of their various
innovative activities is similar to that of their European
counterparts, the magnitude of the private sector’s
efforts in the region is extremely low, especially in
training and knowledge acquisition, but also in R&D.
This is especially regrettable in the case of the larger
firms, since they would seem to be less subject to
information, credit or other restrictions, and should be
closer to the frontier in their respective sectors. The
private sector needs to increase its awareness of this
and its innovation effort in order to be able to absorb
knowledge generated elsewhere in the national
innovation system and abroad.
This will require going beyond measures to
increase the stock of well-trained human capital and
research units: steps must also be taken to improve the
diffusion of knowledge across units. Evidence from the
OECD suggests that, at the micro level, knowledge
generation exhibits decreasing returns to scale, while
at the aggregate level, it shows constant returns to scale.
This suggests that there are substantial knowledge
spillovers among individuals and firms in the economy.
When knowledge creation shows diminishing returns
at the national level, this suggests that such spillovers
may be less prevalent (Bosch, Lederman and Maloney,
2005). Generally, the degree of spillovers appears to
be correlated with such factors as the level of education,
perceived quality of research institutes, degree of
collaboration between research institutes and the private
sector, and intellectual property. These are central
aspects of policy design in the context of a national
innovation system.
The Latin American and Caribbean countries, then,
must begin by making the necessary reforms to secure
a better functioning national innovation system and to
lay the foundations for full participation in the
international science and technology community. Even
if, at present, less exotic sources of productivity growth
could be exploited, it should be borne in mind that, in
practice, reform of the national innovation system and
particularly that related to the science and technology
system may easily take several decades. It will be necessary
to realign incentives, build the required institutions, and
reform or dismantle those that are currently inefficient,
while identifying successful interventions, and all this
probably needs to be begun now.
Pro-equity policies may, in the long run, stimulate
growth by enlisting a greater number of individuals in
the innovation effort.
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